The Yom Kippur War
Soldiers pose on the top of a tank during the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War on October 6, 1973. (Bamahane, Defense Ministry Archives)
The Six-Day War resulted in a humiliating defeat for Israel’s Arab neighbors. After Israel pre-empted attacks from Egypt and Syria, the Israeli Defense Forces captured the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights from both nations, respectively. When Jordan entered the war, Israeli troops quickly captured the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. The UN mediated ceasefire in June,1967 ended the war after only six days, but the underlying issues were far from resolved. The leaders of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, and other Arab nations met in Khartoum, Sudan for the Arab League conference in September, 1967. In the so-called “Khartoum Resolution,” the Arab leaders codified their stance on the Jewish state:
“The Arab Heads of State have agreed to unite their political efforts at the international and diplomatic level to eliminate the effects of the aggression and to ensure the withdrawal of the aggressive Israeli forces from the Arab lands which have been occupied since the aggression of 5 June. This will be done within the framework of the main principles by which the Arab States abide, namely, no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it, and insistence on the rights of the Palestinian people in their own country.”
The infamous “Three No’s” had a profound effect on the Middle Eastern political order for almost thirty years. Shortly afterwards, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 242. The document clarified the “inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war,” making it clear that the UN would not recognize the Israeli annexation of any territory captured in the Six-Day War. It also emphasized “the need to work for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East in which every State in the area can live in security,” a proviso which Palestinian leaders and the surrounding Arab nations would refuse to apply to Israel. Instead, hostilities continued to simmer.
On the Egyptian front, along the Suez Canal, over a dozen skirmishes were recorded between Egyptian and Israeli troops between July, 1967 and March, 1968, prompting the IDF to build a reinforced line of defenses on the eastern side of the canal. The Bar-Lev Line (named after IDF Chief-of-Staff, Chaim Bar-Lev) included 30 reinforced positions, or Mauzzim, which were designed to hold Egyptian forces for at least one or two days in the event of a surprise offensive. On the other side of the Suez Canal, Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser aligned himself with the Soviet Union and acquired hundreds of new tanks, warplanes and other advanced military hardware, including sophisticated anti-aircraft systems. Thousands of Russian technicians and advisors flowed into Egypt, as the Middle Eastern conflict became an extension of the Cold War rivalry between the Soviets and the Israeli-aligned United States. Egyptian artillery began bombarding the Bar-Lev in early 1969 in what became known as the “War of Attrition.” During the following 18 months, hundreds of Israeli soldiers and thousands of Egyptian soldiers and civilians were killed in artillery strikes, airstrikes and commando raids across the Suez Canal, prompting the Egyptian government to relocate many civilian communities. Soviet advisors were also killed, further complicating an already volatile situation. Finally, a ceasefire was reached in August, 1970 which preserved the status quo. But President Nasser was not placated. Batteries of Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAM’s) were positioned near the Bar-Lev Line, as the Egyptian leader secretly prepared for another war. Nasser hoped to force the Israelis into favorable negotiations and regain his nation’s honor after the stinging defeat of 1967, but he wouldn’t live to see the opportunity. Nasser died of a heart attack in September, 1970. He was succeeded by his vice-president Anwar Sadat.
Meanwhile, along Israel’s northern front, the “Purple Line” was established by Israel as a demilitarized zone between Israel and Syria along the eastern slopes of the Golan Heights. Syrian President Hafez al-Assad was even more adamant in his opposition to the Jewish State than Nasser, and President Sadat had little trouble convincing him to join Egypt in planning a coordinated invasion of Israel to recapture territory lost in the Six-Day War. Israel had dug into the Golan Heights, developing several Jewish settlements on the volcanic plateau running south from Mount Hermon, and constructing over a dozen mauzzim emplacements. Israeli leaders were determined that the Golan would never fall back under Syrian control as a vantage point from which to threaten Israeli communities in the Galilee. Along the Jordanian and Lebanese fronts, the War of Attrition took a different form between 1968-1970. From their bases in Jordan, militant factions within the newly-formed Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) began launching terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians in the late 1960’s. The Israelis responded with artillery, airstrikes and commando raids against PLO camps in Jordan, often prompting confrontations with the Jordanian military, including a battle near the Sea of Galilee in August, 1968. On May 22,1970, PLO terrorists ambushed an Israeli school bus on the road to the community of Avivim. Nine Israeli primary school children and three adults were murdered before the attackers fled. In response, the IDF shelled suspected Lebanese PLO camps and began conducting regular patrols in Southern Lebanon. Then in September,1970, PLO-aligned militants hijacked four commercial airliners, including an El Al flight. The jets were forced to land at Dawson’s Field in Jordan, after which 56 Jewish hostages were taken and the other passengers were freed. The hostages were eventually also freed in exchange for PLO prisoners held in Swiss prisons, but not before Jordan’s King Hussein declared martial law and attacked the PLO, forcing them into Lebanon in what became known as Black September. A radical, splinter PLO group calling themselves Black September took the Israeli Olympic team hostage in Munich, Germany during the 1972 summer games, ending in their massacre during a botched rescue attempt. In the following years, Israel and Jordan would begin a secret cooperation in security matters that would become crucial in the years ahead.
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In the Summer of 1973, the signs of war were beginning to emerge. Egypt was mobilizing a significant force along the Suez Canal, although the nonchalant appearance of Egyptian troops and a disinformation campaign in Egyptian newspapers dissuaded Israeli intelligence from interpreting the buildup as a prelude to war. Ashraf Marwan, a son-in-law of late Egyptian president Nasser and a close advisor of President Sadat, was secretly passing intelligence to the Israeli government under the codename “The Angel.” He first warned of an impending Sinai invasion in May, although Sadat reportedly postponed the operation in order to give Syrian President al-Assad more time to prepare for an invasion of the Golan Heights. The false alarm soured Israeli intelligence agencies, as well as Defense Minister Moshe Dayan. They advised Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir against a full mobilization of the Israeli military by excluding the IDF reserve, which made up 80% of Israeli ground forces. When Marwan met with his Mossad handler in London on October 5, 1973, he had an urgent message. Egypt and Syria would launch their invasion the following day during Yom Kippur, the holiest day on the Jewish calendar. Jordanian King Hussein secretly flew to Tel Aviv to meet with Prime Minster Meir and deliver the same message. The IDF scrambled to mobilize, but it was too late.
Shortly before 2:00 PM on October 6, 1973, Egyptian and Syrian artillery began a massive artillery bombardment of Israeli positions along the Suez Canal and the Golan Heights. Over 10,000 Egyptian shells landed along the Bar-Lev line in the first minute of fighting alone. Egyptian warplanes struck Israeli positions in the Sinai, even flying sorties over Tel Aviv. Within an hour, two Egyptian infantry divisions and hundreds of Egyptian tanks were crossing the canal waters, slamming into the Bar-Lev Line, which began to collapse much more quickly than expected. Israeli air power, a key to victory in the Six-Day War, was neutralized by Russian-made air-defense systems, forcing Israeli ground forces to bear the brunt of the Egyptian offensive. By nightfall on the first day, Egyptian forces had pushed Israeli forces back several kilometers and had established a defensive line on the eastern side of the canal. Meanwhile, on the Golan Front, another massive artillery and air bombardment preceded three Syrian tank divisions, which pushed across the Purple Line at different points into Israeli-occupied territory. They attempted to split Israeli defenses and force a retreat. Outnumbered more than fifteen to one, Israeli tank battalions and infantry brigades fought valiantly to hold the line. The Syrian advance was stopped just hours after it began. Fighting was particularly intense and causalities high on both sides near an elevated vantage point named Booster Ridge, just west of an valley which would soon be renamed the “Veil of Tears” as the days of combat dragged on.
The Egyptians and Syrians had timed their attack to catch the Israelis off-guard, towards the end of a national holiday. It appeared that their strategy was succeeding. Since most Israeli men were still observing Yom Kippur, couriers were dispatched to synagogues across the country. Upon hearing news of the invasion, worshippers ran from religious services to muster with their reserve units, some still wearing their tallit (prayer shawls), and prepared to deploy to the fronts. But the situation was already dire. Israeli forces were undermanned and undersupplied. By the evening of the first day of the war, the Israeli government and IDF command were in disarray. Although rattled, Prime Minister Meir spoke to the nation with a calm and steady tone. Despite initial missteps, mostly stemming from bad intelligence assessments, the “Iron Lady” of Israel remained steadfast throughout the conflict. But as the evening of October 6 waned on, the Syrians mounted another offensive along three points, and exhausted Israeli troops were unable to hold the line a second time. Mount Hermon was captured by Syrian troops at the northern end of the Golan, which would remain in Syrian hands for the duration of the war. Israeli infantry and tank brigades were hanging by a thread in the Veil of Tears, while Syrian tanks breached the Israeli line of Mauzzim to the south and reached the strategic Tapline Road. The Golan appeared to be lost, but its defenders refused to give up. Despite staggering casualty rates, approaching 80-90% in some units, Israeli tanks inflicted massive losses on the Syrian army. Over 300 Syrian tanks and 200 other vehicles were destroyed in an area just 45 kilometers square in the Veil of Tears. In the southern Golan, a single IDF infantry division stood between multiple Syrian tank and infantry divisions. Although pushed back to the slopes of the hills surrounding the Sea of Galilee, the defenses held against the onslaught on October 7, denying the Syrians access to civilian communities in the Lower Galilee. By that evening, hastily organized reserve units began to arrive in the Golan. Israeli men, who had been civilians just hours before, exhausted from a day of Yom Kippur fasting, nonetheless provided just enough momentum to halt the Syrian advance Syrian high command balked and ordered its divisions to hold in order to regroup and resupply. The IDF took advantage of the lull to launch a massive counterattack on October 8, pushing the entire invasion force back across the Purple Line just two days later. The tide began to slowly turn on the Northern Front.
Zvika Greengold was an IDF officer candidate who managed to hitchhike his way to the Golani front, then commandeered two repaired tanks with a small cadre of infantrymen and drove out to engage the enemy directly. He encountered the Syrian 51st Independent Tank Brigade, which had broken through the lines and was advancing unopposed. With just two tanks, he engaged the entire brigade, constantly moving under the cover of night to create the illusion of a larger force. His crew single-handedly destroyed six tanks before his primary tank was disabled. He then moved to the secondary tank and continued firing, this time engaging the 452nd Tank Battalion for hours through the night, destroying ten more enemy tanks. The confused Syrians withdrew. Even Zvika’s commanders were confused, assuming that his unit must be “company strength” to inflict such losses. Zvika did not report that he was in fact operating a single tank crew, fearing that his commanders would order him to withdraw. Instead, he continued on, sometimes working alone, and other times attaching his single tank to other IDF brigades in order to tip the scales of an engagement, Even after his tank driver was killed, his tank damaged, and he himself was wounded, Greengold continued on. Finally, after 20 hours of uninterrupted combat, having singlehandedly destroyed dozens of Syrian tanks, the leader of Koah Zvika (Zvika Force) withdrew. Zvika Greengold was later awarded the IDF Medal of Valor, Israel’s highest military decoration, and became a successful businessman and local mayor in the Galilee.
On the Sinai front, Israeli tank brigades arrived for a counterattack against Egyptian positions, only to be repulsed under intense Egyptian artillery and anti-tank fire. The battle had settled into a stalemate by October 9, as Egyptian forces sat on their objective to hold positions on the east side of the canal. IDF Central Command was focused on sustaining the Golan Heights front, so as to prevent a Syrian invasion of the Israeli homeland. Sinai battalions were under orders to hold the line until reinforcements could arrive from Israel. The one bright spot for the Israelis was the deft maneuvering of one tank division, led by General Ariel Sharon, to destroy 50 Egyptian tanks on October 10. Sharon was a veteran of the pre-state Hagenah, involved in the capture of West Jerusalem during the 1948 War of Independence. Later, he was a founder of the elite Unit 101, a special operations force that focused on reprisal operations against Arab fedayeen units who would cross into Israel from Jordan, Syria and Egypt to conduct terrorist attacks. Sharon was a veteran of the Suez Crisis in 1956 and the Six-Day War in 1967. Politically, he joined the Liberal Party in the early 1970’s and had been instrumental in its merger with other parties to form Likud in 1973, just months before he was called back to active duty as the commander of a tank division in the Sinai.
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As the war entered its second week, the tide began to turn. Prime Minister Golda Meir had been lobbying US President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger for arms and supplies since the beginning of the war. However, talks had stalled over American concerns that the Arab League would retaliate against US intervention. Nixon and Kissinger were also concerned about souring relations with the Soviet Union, which had just begun to thaw after Nixon’s famous détente with Soviet Chairman Leonid Brezhnev. When the Israeli government signaled its willingness to deploy its undeclared nuclear arsenal against Egypt and Syria, the American leaders finally agreed to intervene. Operation Nickel Grass commenced on October 14, 1973, delivering over 22,000 tons of ammunition, tanks, artillery and other supplies to Israel via the US Air Force. New vehicles and ammunition rushed to the Sinai and Golan fronts, providing the necessary resupply for Israeli counteroffensives.
After a brief lull on both fronts, the IDF went on the offensive. Breaking through fierce Egyptian resistance on October 15, Sharon’s tank division joined other elements of the Israeli battlegroup in crossing the Suez Canal, pinning down the Egyptian 3rd Army along both its western and eastern banks. After losing over 10,000 men and hundreds of tanks, the Egyptian military was choked off. Likewise, on the Golan Front, Israeli divisions in the north between Mount Hermon and Quneitra began a massive push toward the Syrian capital of Damascus on October 11, while divisions in the south remained in place to defend the Galilee. Despite receiving tens of thousands of reinforcements from Iraq, Jordan and Morocco, the Syrians were unable to stop the Israeli advance once the reserve units and Nickel Grass resupplies arrived. Hundreds of Syrian, Iraqi and Jordanian tanks were destroyed, along with over 3,000 Syrians killed. Although Jordan had entered the war to save face with its Arab neighbors, King Hussein coordinated all of his military’s movements with the Israeli government as a means of minimizing their battlefield engagement. Finally, Israeli long-range artillery came within range of Damascus, shelling an airfield on its outskirts on October 17. Although the IDF had open roads to both the Egyptian and Syrian capitals, the Nixon Administration demanded that the Israeli advances halt on both fronts while it negotiated a ceasefire with the Soviet Union in the interests of preventing a wider-scale conflict. The terms of a ceasefire were stipulated soon afterward in UN Security Council Resolution 338. Passed on October 21st, it ordered both Israeli and Arab governments to cease hostilities within 12 hours and begin negotiations. Before the deadline, the IDF Golani Brigade led one last push up Mount Hermon at the northern end of the Golan, recapturing its outpost from Syrian forces with the help of Israeli paratroopers. Fighting continued past the deadline for several days on the Sinai Front. Israeli battalions finally crossed back to the east bank of the Suez on October 25th after yet another UN Security Council resolution was passed demanding an end to hostilities. With almost 3,000 Israelis dead and an estimated 15-25,000 Arab fighters missing or killed-in-action, the Yom Kippur War had finally ended.
The aftermath of the war was mixed for both Israel and its Arab neighbors. Although Prime Minister Golda Meir had acted resolutely during the conflict, the intelligence failures which had led her to avoid mobilization in the weeks leading up to the war would haunt her. Although a government commission would largely clear her of direct responsibility, instead laying most of the blame on military intelligence assessments, Meir was nonetheless politically weakened by what had seemed to be a failure of her government. She resigned soon afterward in 1974 and was succeeded by Yizhak Rabin. Infighting in Rabin’s Labor Party caused it to fracture, ending a quarter-century of Labor dominance in Israeli politics, and allowing for the rise of the Likud under Menachem Begin’s leadership. Ariel Sharon would serve as Begin’s defense minister before eventually rising to the office of prime minister in 2001.
In Egypt, Anwar Sadat claimed victory. Despite the fact that that Egypt had ultimately failed to gain any territory in the Sinai, the Egyptian government touted their early successes as proof that the Egyptian military could contend with the IDF. This perception enabled Sadat to begin negotiations with the United States and Israel on a bilateral peace agreement with the Jewish State. In Syria, the commanding general considered responsible for the fiasco was tried and summarily executed. The Arab League, which had been actively funding the war effort for Egypt and Syria, made good on its threat against the United States for intervening on Israel’s behalf. An oil embargo was declared by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), driving up the price of oil by over 300% in the US before it finally ended in the Spring of 1974. Although the Yom Kippur War had grave consequences for all parties involved, it proved to the Arab League once and for all that Israel would not be wiped off the map in a conventional war. A combination of peace negotiations and asymmetric warfare would instead be employed in the coming decades.
